Publication detail

Shiffrin et al. argue that scientific practice often produces illusions of understanding; situations in which familiar inferential tools generate misplaced confidence. We describe a related illusion that arises not from statistical misapplications, but from ordinary theory testing itself. Here we highlight a different source of epistemic uncertainty or overconfidence; one that emerges even when statistical tools are used correctly, effect sizes are precisely estimated, findings replicate without controversy, and heterogeneity is explicitly acknowledged within hierarchical models.

@article{davis-stober_etal:in_press:replication,
    title   = {{C}omment on {S}hiffrin et al. (2026): {I}llusions of replication, illusions of truth},
    author  = {Davis-Stober, Clintin P. and Sokratous, Konstantina and Vandekerckhove, Joachim},
    year    = {in press},
    journal = {Computational Brain \& Behavior}
}