Publication detail

Open science aims to address epistemic injustice and global power asymmetries in research infrastructures yet underestimate structural vulnerabilities and inherent risks in data sharing practices. Drawing on an ethnographic study of the GCRF South-South Migration Inequality and Development Hub's (MIDEQ), we argue that even well-intentioned systems do not target vulnerabilities that equitable protocols alone cannot fix. We employ the concept of epistemic disadvantage, a category coextensive with, but separate from epistemic injustice. Epistemic disadvantage includes ethically justified data withholding and misappropriation within consensual systems. These epistemic harms are not adequately captured by existing notions of epistemic extractivism, which focus on the monetization of epistemic resources without regard for the loss incurred by the originating community. We draw on two recent epistemic attitudes: the Book of Truths (BoT), which sees scientific truths as emerging through peer review, and the Book of Conversations (BoC), which values data for the interactions and reflections it provokes. Even when epistemic values recognize knowledge as relational and situated, extractivist harms persist. We argue that extractivism must be reconceptualized to include these subtler, systemic harms rooted in epistemic disadvantage. By distinguishing epistemic disadvantage from injustice, we call for a more nuanced taxonomy of epistemic harms -- one that recognizes that some risks are ethically complex, structurally embedded, and not resolved by better protocols alone.

@article{alcalay_vandekerckhove:in_press:disadvantage,
    title   = {{E}pistemic disadvantage in open science practices},
    author  = {Alcalay, Rena and Vandekerckhove, Joachim},
    year    = {in press},
    journal = {Social Epistemology},
    doi     = {10.1080/02691728.2026.2669557 }
}